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Spousal Testimony in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
Society has a right to every person's evidence.' This principle,
effectuated by the "great power of testimonial compulsion,"2 reflects
society's need to ascertain all relevant facts in the search for truth-
the underlying aim of our adversary judicial system.3 But this prin-
ciple is not an absolute rule; instead, a balancing of interests occurs.
Society's interest in the search for truth is weighted against its inter-
est in the protection and continuation of certain relationships.'
When society's interest in one of these relationships is deemed more
important than its interest in the search for truth, an exception is
created to the rule of testimonial compulsion.5
Pennsylvania recognizes both statutory and judicial exceptions
to the rule of testimonial compulsion. Statutory exceptions offer spe-
cial protection to the husband-wife,6 attorney-client,7 physician-pa-
tient8 and accountant-client 9 relationships. In addition, confidential
communications to news reporters,' 0 clergymen, 1 licensed psycholo-
1. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974). "For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim
that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man's evi-
dence." 8 J. WIGMORRE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
8 WIGMORE].
2. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
3. Justice Frankfurter once wrote,
The pertinent general principle, responding to the deepest needs of society, is that
society is entitled to every man's evidence. As the underlying aim of judicial inquiry
is ascertainable truth, everything rationally related to ascertaining the truth is pre-
sumptively admissible. Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this
general principle only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predomi-
nant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4. Id The balancing approach is also acknowledged in United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323 (1950).
5. See generaly 8 WicMoRE, supra note 1, §§ 2190-2197.
6. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5913-5915, 5923-5927 (Purdon 1981).
7. Id §§ 5916, 5928; Loutzenhizer v. Doddo, 436 Pa. 512, 260 A.2d 745 (1970); In re
Berger Estate, 387 Pa. 425, 128 A.2d 52 (1956); Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa. Super.
Ct. 456, 357 A.2d 689 (1976). See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2290-2329.
8. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929 (Purdon 1981) (applying to civil proceedings only).
See generaly 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2380-2391.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.11(a) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
10. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1981).
11. Id § 5943. See generaly 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2394-2396.
gists, 12 sexual assault counselors, 13 and school personnel'" are ex-
empted from the rule of testimonial compulsion. Judicial exceptions
include a limited privilege protecting trade secrets' 5 and a privilege
protecting informers.' 6 One exception, the privilege against self-in-
crimination, is both constitutionally and statutorily mandated. 7
Two separate and distinct exceptions based upon the marital re-
lationship are recognized in Pennsylvania.'I The first exception is an
incompetency rule that prevents spouses from testifying against each
other during the existence of a valid marriage.' 9 The other exception
is a priviege that prevents testimonial disclosure of confidential mar-
ital communications over the objection of either party.20 The pur-
pose of this comment is to examine both of these exceptions and to
determine whether they continue to meet society's needs.
II. Incompetency of Spouses to Testify Against Each Other
A. Historical Background
1. Origin. -The exact origin of the common-law marital in-
competency rule is unknown. According to at least one commenta-
tor, however, the incompetency rule was preceded by a testimonial
privilege held by married couples, which existed by 1580.21 This
privilege may have had its beginnings in early Roman law, when the
rule of testimonium domesticum prevented testimonial compulsion in
certain situations.22
12. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5944 (Purdon 1981).
13. Amendment to the Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Act No. 169, 1981 Pa. Legis. Serv. - (to be
codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5945.1). See Comment, Rape Victim-Rape Crisis Counselor
Communications, .4 New Testimonial Privilege, 86 DICK L. REV. 601 (1982).
14. Id § 5945.
15. See Huessener v. Fisher & Marks Co., 281 Pa. 535, 127 A. 139 (1924) (common-law
protection against divulging a trade secret unless the demands of justice require disclosure).
16. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284 (1967) (court assumed, with-
out deciding, that the Commonwealth has a limited right to refuse to identify its informers).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5941 (Pur-
don 1981).
18. Commonwealth v. Borris, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 265, 372 A.2d 451, 453-54 (1977).
19. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5913, 5924 (Purdon 1981). See notes 20-120 and accom-
panying text infra.
20. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5914, 5923 (Purdon 1981). See notes 121-166 and ac-
companying text infra.
21. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2227 at 211.
22. See Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child,
74 DICK. L. REV. 599 (1969-70). According to Coburn,
the early Roman law recognized the rule of testimonium domesticum which provided
that parents, children, patrons, freeman [sic], and slaves were prohibited by the Lex
lulia from being compelled to give testimony against each other. The rationale un-
derlying this privilege was not directly related to self-incrimination but rather against
the corruption of the intra-familial relations which would ensure by making uncer-
tain and suspicious what was instinctively assumed to demand the most unrestricted
confidence or uberrimafides, the sanctity of the family based on mutual fidelit,.
Thus, it is not surprising that the specific policy of uberrimafides was consistent y
deemed superior to the general policy of the law, ie., the correct settlement of contro-
versies or the punishment of offenders.
Nevertheless, the rule that spouses could not testify for or
against each other was well established by the early 1600s.2 3 Ameri-
can courts adopted this rule as part of the common law,2 4 and Penn-
sylvania applied the marital incompetency rule, without any
modification, until 1870.25 Although the rule itself remained essen-
tially unchanged from its origin until the late nineteenth century, the
reasons advanced for its existence varied as the law underwent
changes.
2. Rationale. -The justification for the marital incompetency
rule can be divided into three categories-unity of identity, interest,
and public policy. Unity of identity, a common-law concept that
presumed the husband and wife to be one,26 was advanced by Lord
Coke in 1628 as a reason for the incompetency rule. 7 Coke's ration-
ale reflected the religious view of marriage as creating "two souls in
one flesh."2z8 Since the wife had no separate legal existence, 9 her
individual testimony was excluded.3
Closely tied to the concept of unity of identity was the common-
law rule of disqualification by interest.3 Courts reasoned that those
persons who had an interest in the case, especially a pecuniary inter-
est, were particularly susceptible to the temptation of perjury;32
therefore, all interested persons, including parties, were excluded
from the witness stand.33 Since the party to the action was disquali-
fied on the ground of interest, the party's spouse was also disquali-
fied, because the spouses' interests were considered one and the
same.
34
Id at 602 n.16.
23. E. COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON 6b (1628); 2 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 600 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 2 WIGMOREJ.
24. See, e.g., Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839); Lessee of Snyder v.
Snyder, 6 Binn. 483 (Pa. 1814).
25. In 1870 the incompetency rule, which absolutely disqualified spousal testimony, was
modified to permit spouses to testifyfor each other in civil proceedings. Yeager v. Weaver, 64
Pa. 425 (1870).
26. At common law the wife's identity merged with that of her husband. This concept is
no longer considered valid in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Hack v. Hack, - Pa. -, -, 433 A.2d
859, 864 (1981) (rejecting unity of identity as a basis for interspousal tort immunity).
27. E. COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628).
28. Id
29. Hack v. Hack, - Pa.-, -, 433 A.2d 859, 864 (1981).
30. Pennsylvania considered the husband and wife as being but one witness. Sower v.
Weaver, 78 Pa. 443 (1875). This fiction was formally abrogated in Guernsey v. Froude, 13 Pa.
Super. Ct. 405 (1900).
31. Disqualification of favorable spousal testimony first occurred in the early seventeenth
century, when interest became a disqualification. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 600.
32. Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1892). At common law the courts
disqualified witnesses when they had any reason to believe a witness might lie, for example,
being a party to the action, sharing interests with a party, having been convicted of a crime, or
being devoid of religious beliefs. Id See generally 2 WIGMORE, supra note 22, §§ 575-587.
33. Id § 576.
34. Id §600.
Although the rule of incompetency based solely on interest was
later abrogated,35 the spousal incompetency rule survived. Instead
of justifying the rule on grounds of unity of identity or interest, the
courts came to rely primarily on the public policy rationale.36
Courts reasoned that public policy favored the protection and pres-
ervation of marital relationships,37 a societal interest that out-
weighed society's interests in the search for truth and the fair
administration of justice.3" Societal interests favoring the marital re-
lationship were recognized in 1736, when Lord Hardwicke wrote,
"The reason why the law will not suffer a wife to be a witness for or
against her husband is, to preserve the peace of families . . . 39
Thus, although the public policy of preserving marital relationships
may have been a reason for the courts' recognition of the marital
incompetency rule even in early common-law times, it was not until
the demise of the disqualification-by-interest rule that public policy
became the primary, if not the sole, justification for the rule of mari-
tal incompetency.
American courts adopted Lord Hardwicke's interpretation of
public policy. The United States Supreme Court reflected the view
of American courts when, in Stein v. Bowman,40 it stated,
This [marital incompetency] rule is founded upon the deepest
and soundest principles of our nature. Principles which have
grown out of those domestic relations, that constitute the basis of
civil society; and which are essential to the enjoyment of that con-
fidence which should subsist between those who are connected by
the nearest and dearest relations of life. To break down or impair
the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and
wife, would be to destroy the best solace of human existence.4'
3. Statutory Enactment. -Nineteenth century statutes affected
the incompetency rule. Husbands and wives became "admissible"
witnesses in England in 1853,42 with exceptions pertaining to crimi-
35. The Pennsylvania Legislature removed the broad common-law testimonial disquali-
fication of interested persons in the Act of April 15, 1869, P.L. 30, No. 31, § 1.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Crow Dog, 3 Dak. 106, 14 N.W. 437 (1882), rev'd on other
grounds, 109 U.S. 556 (1888). See generally 2 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 619.
In Kelley v. Proctor, 41 N.H. 139 (1860), the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized
that the incompetency rule had a compound justification, founded partly in interest and unity
of identity principles, and partly upon considerations of public policy. Consequently, when
disqualification by interest was removed, public policy provided an adequate basis for the
marital incompetency rule. Id at 143.
37. See Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839) (recognizing public policy
grounds for the common-law marital incompetency rule in the federal courts).
38. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. The court in Barbat v. Allen, 155 Eng. Rep.
1092 (Ex. 1852), acknowledged that society's interest in the administration of justice is out-
weighed by its interest in preserving marital relationships.
39. Barker v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1736).
40. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839).
41. Id at 223.
42. Evidence Amendment Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., c. 83, § 1.
nal proceedings and communications.4 3 In 1869 the Pennsylvania
Legislature removed the broad common-law testimonial disqualifi-
cation of interested persons," but the marital incompetency rule re-
mained essentially intact. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
interpretation of the 1869 act in Yeager v. Weaver,45 allowing
favorable spousal testimony in civil cases, 46 resulted in the first
change in Pennsylvania's absolute rule of spousal incompetency.
In 1887 the Pennsylvania Legislature followed Yeager and en-
tirely eliminated the part of the common-law marital incompetency
rule that excluded favorable spousal testimony.4 7 Since parties to
the action were no longer excluded from the witness stand because of
interest,48 exclusion of spousal testimony on the same grounds no
longer seemed appropriate.49 The United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized this logic when, in removing the common-law bar of
favorable spousal testimony in federal courts, it stated that "a refusal
to permit the wife upon the ground of interest to testify on behalf of
her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to
testify for himself, presents a manifest incongruity."50
The 1887 legislation in Pennsylvania brought about a funda-
mental change in the judicial approach to spousal testimony; compe-
tency became the rule and incompetency the exception. 5 Courts
interpreted the 1887 legislation to be an enabling act.52 Neverthe-
less, the exceptions to the competency rule proved to be larger than
the rule itself. Adverse spousal testimony was still excluded, except
in a few narrowly drawn situations.53 The Pennsylvania Legislature
elected not only to continue the common-law rule that disqualified
adverse spousal testimony, but also to "reinforce and guard [it] from
43. Id § 2-3.
44. Act of April 15, 1869, P.L. 30, No. 31, § 1. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text
supra See also Estate of Grossman, 486 Pa. 460, 406 A.2d 726 (1979).
45. 64 Pa. 425 (1870).
46. Id at 427. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Yeager that the legislature
clearly intended that husbands and wives should be competent witnesses for, but not against,
each other. Id
47. Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, No. 89, § 1. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 453 Pa.
302, 312, 309 A.2d 569, 574 (1973) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Favorable spousal testimony is
admissible in all criminal and civil proceedings in Pennsylvania. 2 G. HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA
EVIDENCE § 780 (4th ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as 2 HENRY].
48. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
49. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
50. Id at 381.
51. See Commonwealth v. Clanton, 395 Pa. 521, 527, 151 A.2d 88, 92 (1959).
52. See, e.g., In re Brown's Estate, 131 Pa. Super. Ct. 463, 467, 200 A. 940, 941-42 (1938).
An enabling act is the "[tlerm applied to any statute enabling persons or corporations to do
what before they could not. It is applied to statutes which confer new powers." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 472 (5th ed. 1979).
53. The common-law rule that rendered spouses incompetent to testify against each other
was incorporated into the Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, No. 89, §§ 2(b), 5(c). Seegenerall, 2
HENRY, supra note 46, § 780.
invasion by statutory enactment." 54  This 1887 legislation remains
the foundation of current law.
B. Current Law Prohibiting Adverse Spousal Testimony
Sections 591115 and 592156 of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code57
establish the rule that all persons are competent witnesses in criminal
and civil proceedings. Additionally, the Code delineates several ex-
ceptions to the general rule of competency,58 including those excep-
tions based on the marital relationship.59 Sections 591360 and
5924(a)6 t provide that spouses are neither competent nor permitted
54. Canole v. Allen, 222 Pa. 156, 159, 70 A. 1053, 1055 (1908).
55. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5911 (Purdon 1981).
56. Id § 5921.
57. Id §§ 101-9781.
58. See notes 7-9, 10-13 & 16 supra.
59. See note 6 supra.
60. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913 (Purdon 1981) states,
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in a criminal proceeding hus-
band and wife shall not be competent or permitted to testify against each other, ex-
cept that in proceedings for desertion and maintenance, and in any criminal
proceeding against either for bodily injury or violence attempted, done or threatened
upon the other, or upon the minor children of said husband and wife, or the minor
children of either of them, or any minor children in their care or custody, or in the
care or custody of either of them, each shall be a competent witness against the other,
and except also that either of them shall be competent merely to prove the fact of
marriage, in support of a criminal charge of bigamy alleged to have been committed
by or with the other.
Pennsylvania is one of only six states which provide that one spouse is incompetent to
testify against the other in a criminal proceeding. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 621-18 (Supp.
1975); IOWA CODE § 662.7 (1950); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (Baldwin Supp. 1980);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-104 (1977).
Sixteen states provide a privilege against adverse spousal testimony vested in both spouses
or in the defendant spouse alone. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (1978); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1981); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2162
(1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5 (Supp.
1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (Vernon 1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 46-16-212
(1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49-295 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-17 (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8
(1977); VA. CODE § 19.2-27 1.1 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1981);
W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1966).
Ten states and the District of Columbia entitle the witness-spouse alone to assert a privi-
lege against adverse spousal testimony. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-227 (1975); ALASKA R. CRIM.
PRoc. § 26(b)(2) (1968); CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
84a (West Supp. 1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1604 (1981);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (Baldwin 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:461 (West 1981);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101, -106 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233,
§ 20 (West Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10 (1970).
Eighteen states have abolished the privilege in criminal cases. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-
1001, R. EVID. 501, 504 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3502 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 90.501, .504 (West 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-14-4, 35-1-31-3 (Burns 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-407 (1976); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.27 (1974); N.M. R. EVID. 501,
505 (1978 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 60.10 (McKinney 1971); N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW § 4502 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1979); N.D. R. EViD. 501, 504
(Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2103, 2501 (West 1980); S.C. CODE § 19-11-30
(1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-1 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2404 (1975); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1973); WIS. STAT. § 905.01 (1975).
61. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5924(a) (Purdon 1981) states, "In a civil matter neither
husband nor wife shall be competent or permitted to testify against each other."
to testify against each other in criminal and civil proceedings. Al-
though the Code deals with criminal and civil proceedings sepa-
rately, the rule of spousal incompetency is essentially the same for
both proceedings.
1. Scope. -Sections 5913 and 5924(a) are truly incompetency
statutes; they prohibit adverse spousal testimony regardless of the
spouses' desires.62 In this respect, the marital incompetency rule is
broader than any other exception to the general rule of testimonial
compulsion recognized in Pennsylvania.63
A valid marriage is the only prerequisite for invocation of the
marital incompetency rule.' 4 "The test is not whether the parties to
an allegedly lawful marriage believe they are lawfully married; the
test is whether in law they are legally married. ' 65 Moreover, the bur-
den is on the objecting party to prove incompetency.66 Since the
question of competency is a matter of law, it is to be decided by the
judge, unless factual issues are present.67
Spouses are incompetent witnesses only while married; they be-
come competent upon divorce68 or death.69 Furthermore, they are
only incompetent "to testify against each other."7 ° Spouses may be
used as sources of evidence against each other.7' The Pennsylvania
62. Canole v. Allen, 222 Pa. 156, 159, 70 A. 1053, 1055 (1908).
63. See notes 7-16 and accompanying text supra.
64. Commonwealth v. Jones, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 352, 307 A.2d 397 (1973) (testimony of
an alleged common-law wife was admissible). The testimony of a paramour is not incompe-
tent, 8 WIGMORE, supra note I, § 2230 at 223, nor are partners in a bigamous marriage incom-
petent. Id § 2231, at 224.
for the beneficial and detrimental aspects of extending the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony to those couples not lawfully married, see Comment, The Husband-Wfe
Evidentiary Privileges: Is Marriage Really Necessary?, 1977 ARIZ. S.L.J. 411.
65. Commonwealth v. Clanton, 395 Pa. 521, 528, 151 A.2d 88, 92 (1959). In Clanton the
wife was a competent witness against her second husband because she had never divorced her
first husband before her remarriage.
66. Id; Commonwealth v. Mudgett, 174 Pa. 211, 34 A. 588 (1896). The defendant-spouse
has the burden to rebut the presumption that favors competency. Commonwealth v. Carey,
105 Pa. Super. Ct. 362, 365, 161 A. 410, 411 (1932). Moreover, that burden is not met by mere
allegations that a valid marriage exists. Commonwealth v. Walton, 245 Pa. Super. Ct. 169,
172, 369 A.2d 347, 349 (1976), rev'don other grounds, 483 Pa. 588, 397 A.2d 1179 (1979).
67. Commonwealth v. March, 248 Pa. 434, 94 A. 142 (1915); Commonwealth v. Mudgett,
175 Pa. 211, 34 A. 588 (1896); Commonwealth v. Carey, 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 362, 161 A. 410
(1932).
68. Commonwealth v. Peluso, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 330, 337, 361 A.2d 852, 856, rev'don
other grounds, 481 Pa. 641, 393 A.2d 344 (1978).
69. Huffman v. Simmons, 131 Pa. Super. Ct. 370, 377, 200 A. 274, 277 (1938). See gener-
ally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2237.
70. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5913, 5924(a) (Purdon 1981) (emphasis added). See
notes 59 & 60 supra.
71. See Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 251, 199 A.2d 411, 413, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 939 (1964); Kine v. Foreman, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 305, 209 A.2d 1 (1965) (spouse was
competent to testify to income tax records, even though testimony might be adverse to other
spouse).
The distinction between testifying and providing evidence against the other spouse is im-
portant. See, e.g., In re Rover, 377 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1300, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975). Evidence provided by one spouse introduced against the other
Supreme Court, for example, held that a wife's actions did not con-
stitute "the giving of testimony" when she gave letters, which had
been written by her husband to another woman, to another person
who in turn gave them to the police.72
Although the incompetency statutes generally apply to all crimi-
nal and civil proceedings, 73 one proceeding apparently exempt from
their application is the mental health hearing. In 1979 the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court, in Commonwealth ex rel. Platt v. Platt,74
held that a spouse who testifies at a mental health hearing for invol-
untary commitment of the other spouse is not testifying against the
other within the meaning of the incompetency statutes." In addition
to the exemption concerning mental health hearings, certain other
exemptions serve to limit the effect of the marital exception to the
rule of testimonial compulsion.76 In essence, they are exceptions to
the exception, limited situations in which the marital exception does
not apply because the legislature or the courts have decided that the
search for truth outweighs the need to preserve marital relationships.
2. Exceptions to the Marital Incompetency Rule. -What may
be the oldest exception to the marital incompetency rule is codified
in section 591377 of the Judicial Code,7 8 which pertains to criminal
proceedings only. Section 5913 provides that spouses are competent
witnesses "in any criminal proceeding against either for bodily in-
jury or violence attempted, done or threatened upon the other.
79
This exception to the incompetency rule originated in Lord Audley's
Case8" in 1631. Lord Mansfield, commenting on this exception a
by means other than the testimony of that spouse is admissible. Id at 955. Thus, a spouse
who furnishes handwriting samples is not an incompetent source of evidence against the other
spouse. Id
72. Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 251, 199 A.2d 411, 413, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
939 (1964).
73. 2 HENRY, supra note 46, § 780. "The public policy of preserving the marital relation-
ship is not dependent upon the type of judicial proceedings. ... State v. Schier, 47 Or.
App. 1075, -, 615 P.2d 1147, 1149 (1980) (the marital privilege is available in a probation
revocation proceeding).
74. 266 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 404 A.2d 410 (1979).
75. Id at 282, 404 A.2d at 413. The appellant-wife contended that the lower court im-
properly committed her to a hospital for involuntary emergency psychiatric treatment. Ac-
cording to the appellant, her husband's testimony should have been excluded at the
commitment hearing because of the marital incompetency rules barring adverse spousal testi-
mony. The superior court rejected her argument. The court stated, "Assuming that he is acting
in goodfaith the very purpose of his testimony is not to do something adverse to his wife but to
help her obtain the help that she needs." Id (emphasis added).
76. See notes 76-107 and accompanying text infra.
77. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913 (Purdon 1981).
78. Id §§ 101-9781.
79. Id § 5913. See note 59 supra.
80. 3 How. St. Tr. 402 (1631). In Lord Audley's Case the House of Lords tried Lord
Audley as a principal in the second degree for a rape upon his wife. Since the wife was the
party wronged, the House of Lords allowed her testimony. Otherwise, the Lords reasoned, she
might have been abused again.
century and a half later, wrote,
There never has been an instance either in a civil or criminal
case where the husband or wife has been permitted to be a witness
for or against each other, except in case of necessity, and that ne-
cessity is not a general necessity, as where no other witness can be
had, but a particular necessity, as where, for instance the wife
would otherwise be exposed without remedy to personal injury.8"
As Lord Mansfield explained, this exception is based only on
necessity. 2 Like the common-law exception, Pennsylvania's current
law requires "bodily injury or violence attempted, done or
threatened"8 3 upon the spouse. Spouses victimized by nonviolent,
nonphysical crimes committed by their spouses are not rendered
competent by this provision.
The Pennsylvania Legislature extended the necessity exception
in 1909 when it passed an amendment to the 1887 statute.84 The
1909 amendment8" provided that spouses are competent to testify in
cases of violence against minor children of bo h or either spouse
8 6
and minor children in their custody.87 Thus, defenseless children are
81. Bentley v. Cook, 99 Eng. Rep. 729, 729 (K.B. 1784).
According to the court in Reeve v. Wood, 122 Eng. Rep. 867 (Q.B. 1864), the necessity
exception, which permitted adverse testimony from a victimized spouse, "arose partly from the
mischief which would have followed from her exclusion, partly from necessity, and partly
from the consideration that she was, in reality the prosecuting party." Id at 868. Failure to
recognize this exception would result in an injustice to the victim-spouse. 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 1, § 2239 at 242. Moreover, once one spouse physically abuses the other, the domestic
peace, which the incompetency rule attempts to foster, is already destroyed. See Soule's Case,
5 Me. 407 (1828).
82. See notes 79 & 80 and accompanying text supra.
83. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913 (Purdon 1981). The provision in section 5913 per-
mitting a victim-spouse to testify is a re-enactment of the Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, No.
89, § 2(b). See note 52 and accompanying text supra. See generally 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 1,
§ 2239.
At common law the necessity exception, which allowed victim-spouses to testify, was nar-
rowly drawn to include little more than corporal brutalities. Id But see United States v.
Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975), in which the court noted that "[a]n 'offense against the
other' has been broadly interpreted to include any personal wrong done to the other, whether
physically, mentally or morally injurious." Id at 1365. Accord, Wyatt v. United States, 362
U.S. 525 (1960).
84. Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, No. 89, § 2(b).
85. Act of April 27, 1909, P.L. 179, No. 126, § 1.
86. The federal courts recognized an exception to permit adverse spousal testimony in
child-abuse cases in United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975). The court put forth
the following reasons for its decision: (1) a serious crime against a child is an offense against
society and destroys family harmony; (2) parental testimony is necessary in prosecutions for
child abuse; (3) justice demands the discovery of truth; (4) a crime against a child is a wrong
against the other spouse; and (5) the trend among states is to recognize an exception to allow
spousal testimony in cases of child abuse and neglect. Id
States that do not have a statutory provision similar to Pennsylvania's have liberally con-
strued related statutes to allow adverse spousal testimony in cases of child abuse. See, e.g.,
O'Loughlin v. People, 90 Colo. 368, -, 10 P.2d 543, 546 (1932) (husband's murder of his
stepdaughter was "a crime committed by one [spouse] against the other"); Chamberlain v.
State, 348 P.2d 280, 282 (Wyo. 1960) (husband's rape of his daughter was a "crime committed
by one spouse against the other").
87. See Commonwealth v. Cathcart, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 403 (C.P. Del. 1970) (wife was a
competent witness against her husband, who allegedly raped their four-year-old niece).
protected by the testimony of the nonassaulting parent. This provi-
sion is now included within section 5913.88
Another exception to the rule of marital incompetency, argua-
bly just an extension of the necessity exception,89 is the "same-crimi-
nal-episode" 90 exception. As the name indicates, the same-criminal-
episode exception is applicable only to criminal proceedings. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court enunciated the exception in Common-
wealth v. Galloway.
91
[T]he spouse of an accused is competent under [section 5913 of the
Judicial Code] to testify against the defendant as to a crime com-
mitted against a third person when such crime occurs in the same
criminal episode as an act of violence committed by the accused
upon the spouse, regardless of whether separate criminal proceed-
ings are involved. 9'
The same-criminal-episode exception was first recognized by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Robinson."
88. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913 (Purdon 1981). See note 59 supra. For a case ap-
plying this exception, see Commonwealth ex rel Barnowsky v. Maroney, 414 Pa. 161, 199
A.2d 424 (1964). In Maroney, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the lower court's deci-
sion to allow adverse testimony by defendant's wife over the defendant-husband's objection.
The husband, who allegedly shot and killed their eighteen-year-old son, contended that be-
cause the victim-son was eighteen years of age, he was no longer a minor child, and conse-
quently the wife was an incompetent witness. The court held, however, that an eighteen-year-
old is not an adult; therefore, the wife was competent.
89. See notes 77-82 and accompanying text supra.
90. Commonwealth v. Galloway, 271 Pa. Super. Ct. 305, 310, 413 A.2d 418, 421 (1979).
91. Id In Galloway the defendant-husband allegedly assaulted and pointed a deadly
weapon at his wife. Immediately thereafter he initiated a fight with a male friend of his wife.
As the wife fled to call the police, the husband allegedly shot the man. The husband was
charged with murder. The trial court nolle prossed the charges resulting from the defendant-
husband's attack on his wife. In a separate trial for the murder of the third party, the trial
court refused to allow the wife's testimony. The Commonwealth appealed and the superior
court, applying the decision in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 468 Pa. 575, 364 A.2d 665 (1976),
reversed, holding that the same-criminal-episode test applies even though the defendant-
spouse is tried in separate proceedings. See notes 92 & 93 and accompanying text infra.
92. Commonwealth v. Galloway, 271 Pa. Super. Ct. 305, 312, 413 A.2d 418, 421 (1979)
(emphasis added).
93. 468 Pa. 575, 364 A.2d 665 (1976): In Robinson a jury convicted the appellant-hus-
band of murder in the first degree, two counts each of assault and battery, and assault and
battery with intent to kill in the shootings of his estranged wife and her employer. In addition
to testifying about the attack on her, the appellant's wife also testified to acts directed against
the other two victims. The appellant contended that this was error, but the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court sustained the trial court and allowed the wife's testimony because all the at-
tacks occurred at the same time and place. Id at 585-86, 364 A.2d at 670-71. This holding
represents a significant extension of the necessity exception, which was originally designed to
protect only the victim-spouse. See notes 76-82 and accompanying text supra.
The Robinson court found persuasive the "single criminal event" test enunciated by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969). New Jersey's
single event test is as follows:
If there is a single criminal event in which [the wife] and others are targets or victims
of the husband's criminal conduct in the totality of the integrated incident and formal
charges are made against the husband for some or all the offenses committed (one of
which charges is for an offense against the spouse), the wife should be a competent
and compellable witness against her husband at the trial of all the cases regardless of
whether they are tried separately or in one proceeding. And, in this connection it
should be immaterial that the offense against the wife does not reach the same
dimensions of criminality as it does against the third-party victim.
Although the defendant-spouse in Robinson had been tried in a sin-
gle proceeding for attacks against his wife and third parties, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Galloway held that as long as the
crimes occur in the same episode, the victim-spouse is competent in
all subsequent proceedings relating to the event.94 Thus, as a result
of the Robinson and Galloway decisions, the current necessity excep-
tion to the marital incompetency rule is broader than the common-
law rule.
An additional exception to the marital incompetency rule en-
ables a spouse whose character or conduct is attacked by the other
spouse to testify in rebuttal. This exception applies to criminal95 and
civil 9 6 proceedings. In criminal proceedings the attacking spouse
must be the defendant. In civil proceedings, however, the spouse
who attacks the other spouse's character or conduct need not be the
defendant;97 the other spouse is competent to rebut provided either
spouse is a party to the action.98 Furthermore, to be competent in
either a criminal or civil proceeding, the spouse's character or con-
duct need not be directly in issue.99
Another exception to the marital incompetency rule applicable
to both criminal and civil proceedings is the judicial exception that
allows a spouse who acts as an agent for the other spouse to testify
against the principal-spouse concerning matters within the scope of
the spouse's agency." Hence, the marital relationship is not always
a bar to adverse spousal testimony.
Other statutory exceptions in criminal proceedings provide that
spouses are competent witnesses "in proceedings for desertion and
maintenance,"'O' and "to prove the fact of marriage, in support of a
criminal charge of bigamy alleged to have been committed by or
with the other."'' 0 A 1911 amendment0 3 added the bigamy provi-
sion to the 1877 statute.
Id at 507, 251 A.2d at 446 (emphasis added). See also State v. Thompson, 88 Wash. 2d 518,
564 P.2d 315 (1977) (allowing spousal testimony when murder of wife's paramour was part of
same transaction as defendant's assault upon his wife).
94. Commonwealth v. Galloway, 271 Pa. Super. Ct. 305, 312, 413 A.2d 418, 421 (1979).
95. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5915 (Purdon 1981). Section 5915 is substantially a reen-
actment of the Act of April 11, 1899, P.L. 41, No. 40, § 2.
96. Id §§ 5925, 5926 (derived from the Act of April 11, 1899, P.L. 41, No. 40, § 1 and the
Act of May 8, 1907, P.L. 184, No. 146 § 1.
97. Id § 5915 (limits testimony by a spouse in rebuttal to a criminal proceeding "brought
against the husband or wife") (emphasis added).
98. See id §§ 5925, 5926.
99. Commonwealth v. Garanchoskie, 251 Pa. 247, 96 A. 513 (1916); Commonwealth ex
re. Haines v. Banniller (No. 2), 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 219 (C.P. Cumb.), a 7dper uriam, 398 Pa.
7, 157 A.2d 167 (1959).
100. See Barnhart v. Grantham, 197 Pa. 502, 47 A. 866 (1901); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1,
§ 2240.
101. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913 (Purdon 1981).
102. Id
103. Act of May 11, 1911, P.L. 269, No. 170, § 1.
Additional exceptions to the marital incompetency rule applica-
ble to civil proceedings render spouses competent in actions for di-
vorce, t°4 support,10 5 and child custody; t° 6 in actions arising under
the Protection from Abuse Act;' 07 and in actions brought by either
spouse to recover separate property. 10 8 No other exceptions are rec-
ognized in Pennsylvania.
3. Waiver. -Failure to object at trial to the competency of a
witness generally constitutes a waiver't °9 When it is unquestioned
that the party and witness are lawfully married, however, failure to
object does not constitute a waiver.1 0 Instead, the trial judge must
take notice and prevent the incompetent spousal testimony."'
Neither connivance by the parties nor indulgence by the court can
render the spouse competent." 2 The reason for nonwaiver is that
the incompetency statutes"l 3 provide that spouses are not permitted
to testify against each other.' '4 Nevertheless, when the marriage re-
lationship is not apparent, failure to object at trial does constitute a
waiver 5 and the trial judge has no duty to raise the question of
competency. " 16
4. Inferences. -Since adverse spousal testimony generally is
excluded regardless of the parties' wishes, 7 an inevitable issue con-
cerns the permissible inferences to be drawn by the facttinder from
the absence of spousal testimony. In Commonwealth v. Moore,"8 a
criminal case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that neither the
Commonwealth nor the trial judge may comment on the defendant-
104. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5924(b)(1) (Purdon 1981) (derived from the Act of May
2, 1929, P.L. 1237, No. 430, § 50).
105. Id § 5924(b)(2) (derived from the Act of May 23, 1907, P.L. 227, No. 176, § 1). See
Commonwealth v. Trimble, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 644, 180 A.2d 92 (1962).
106. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5924(b)(3) (Purdon 1981).
107. Id § 5924(b)(4).
108. Id § 5927 (derived from the Act of June 8, 1893, P.L. 344, No. 284, § 4.
109. Commonwealth v. Smith, 278 Pa. Super. Ct. 21, 419 A.2d 1335 (1980).
110. Commonwealth v. Stots, 436 Pa. 555, 558, 261 A.2d 577, 579 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Conyers, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 386, 357 A.2d 569 (1976).
111. Ulrich's Case, 267 Pa. 233, 109 A. 922 (1920); Canole v. Allen, 222 Pa. 156, 70 A.
1053 (1908).
112. Canole v. Allen, 222 Pa. 156, 159, 70 A. 1053, 1055 (1908).
113. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5913, 5924(a) (Purdon 1981).
114. Id See notes 59 & 60 supra.
115. Commonwealth v. Stots, 436 Pa. 555, 261 A.2d 577 (1970); Commonwealth v. Cony-
ers, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 386, 357 A.2d 569 (1976); Commonwealth v. Walton, 245 Pa. Super. Ct.
169, 359 A.2d 347 (1976), rev'don other grounds, 483 Pa. 588, 397 A.2d 1179 (1979) (appellant's
failure to raise an objection to testimony of his alleged common-law wife at time of trial or in
post-verdict motions constituted a waiver). But cf. Canole v. Allen, 222 Pa. 156, 159, 70 A.
1053, 1055 (1908) (connivance by the parties cannot evade the marital incompetency rule).
116. Commonwealth v. Stots, 436 Pa. 555, 559, 261 A.2d 577, 579 (1970).
117. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
118. 453 Pa. 302, 309 A.2d 569 (1973).
spouse's failure to call the other spouse as a witness.' 9 The decision
overruled a seventy-eight-year-old precedent. 20 The court reasoned
that the whole purpose of the marital incompetency rule would be
negated if the inference were allowed to operate.' 2 1 Since the mari-
tal incompetency rule is the same for civil proceedings, the holding
in Moore should apply to civil proceedings, although the supreme
court has yet to rule directly on this point.
III. Confidential Marital Communications Privilege
A. Historical Background
The privilege 22 for confidential marital communications ap-
peared in the second half of the seventeenth century, but the privi-
lege as it now exists did not become a separate and distinct rule until
the second half of the nineteenth century. 23 This occurred in many
jurisdictions at the same time as the marital incompetency rule was
being either abolished or transformed into a waivable privilege.'
24
Little need for a privilege to safeguard the confidentiality of marital
communications existed since all spousal testimony was generally
excluded under the marital incompetency rule.
Pennsylvania courts recognized the marital communications
privilege as part of the common law. 25 Not until 1853, however, did
119. Id In Moore, the district attorney, over the objection of defense counsel, argued that
the defendant's failure to call his wife permitted the jury to draw the inference that her testi-
mony would have been unfavorable. The trial judge's instructions were to the same effect. Id
See Commonwealth v. Felder, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 163, 335 A.2d 827 (1975).
120. Commonwealth v. Moore, 453 Pa. 302, 309 A.2d 569 (1973), expressly overruled
Commonwealth v. Weber, 167 Pa. 153, 31 A. 481 (1895), which had been reaffirmed in Com-
monwealth ex re. Haines v. Banmiller, 398 Pa. 7, 157 A.2d 167 (1959) (unanimous per curiam
decision).
121. Commonwealth v. Moore, 453 Pa. 302, 307, 309 A.2d 569, 571 (1973).
Although the Commonwealth may not have the jury draw an inference from the failure of
the defendant to call his spouse to testify, it may nevertheless have the opportunity to use the
testimony of the defendant's spouse against the defendant. If the defendant has the spouse
testify for the defendant, then the Commonwealth, on cross-examination, has an opportunity
to elicit adverse spousal testimony. Commonwealth v. Hartung, 156 Pa. Super. Ct. 176, 39
A.2d 734 (1944). Thus the defendant-spouse who calls the other spouse to present favorable
testimony runs the risk of adverse spousal testimony on cross-examination. Id The same rule
applies to civil proceedings. Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. 425 (1870). See generally 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 22, § 613.
122. A privilege is "[a] particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person,
company, or class, beyond the common advantages of other citizens." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1077 (5th ed. 1979). In Pennsylvania, testimonial privileges are waivable, see 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5916, 5928-5929, 5941-5943 (Purdon 1981), but the marital incompe-
tency rule is not, see notes 109-113 and accompanying text supra. Awareness of this distinction
is essential to an adequate understanding of Pennsylvania's marital exceptions to the general
rule of testimonial compulsion.
123. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2333. The oldest of the confidential communications
privileges is the attorney-client privilege, which was recognized during the reign of Elizabeth I
in 1577. Id § 2290.
124. Id § 2333. Pennsylvania is one of only six states that still recognize the old common-
law marital incompetency rule. See note 59 supra. All other states either recognize no testi-
monial exception during the marriage or recognize a privilege in one or both spouses. See id
125. See, e.g., Cornell v. Vanartsdalen, 4 Pa. 364 (1846).
the privilege receive its first official recognition by a legislative body.
England's Evidence Amendment Act of 1853 126 included a provision
rendering spouses competent but not compellable to testify about
confidential communications. 127 Nearly twenty-five years later the
Pennsylvania Legislature statutorily recognized the common-law
confidential marital communications privilege. t21 The act provided
that neither the husband nor the wife were to be "competent or per-
mitted to testify to confidential communication made by one to the
other, unless this privilege be waived upon the trial."' 29 The same
privilege applied to both criminal 30 and civil' 3 ' proceedings.
Since the marital communications privilege claims a shorter his-
tory than the marital incompetency rule, 32 the rationale advanced
for the privilege does not parallel that of the incompetency rule.1
3
By the time the marital communications privilege became separately
recognized,'34 disqualification of witnesses for interest was being
abolished,' and accordingly, statutes removing disqualification for
interest had no effect on the marital communications privilege.'
36
The principal justification for the privilege is public policy--the
public policy that favors the preservation of harmonious marital re-
lationships. 37 Like the marital incompetency rule and other testi-
monial privileges, the marital communications privilege resulted
from the weighing of society's interest in preserving marriages
against the interest in truth and the fair administration of justice.'3
Courts and legislatures generally believe that the privilege is neces-
sary to foster the confidences desired between marital partners.
139
126. 16 & 17 Vict., c. 83.
127. Id § 3. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 82, at 169 (1954); Comment, Marital Privi-
leges, 46 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 71, 72 n.10 (1969). See also note 41 and accompanying text
supra.
128. Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, No. 89, §§ 2(c), 5(b). See 2 HENRY, supra note 46,
§ 699.
129. Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, No. 89, §§ 2(c), 5(b).
130. Id § 2(c).
131. Id § 5(b).
132. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
133. For the justifications for the marital incompetency rule, see notes 25-40 and accom-
panying text supra.
134. The marital communications privilege became a separate exception to the general
rule of testimonial compulsion in the second half of the nineteenth century. 8 WiGMORE,
supra note 1, § 2333.
135. See note 34 supra.
136. Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342, 349 (1897).
137. See id As stated by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa.
Super. Ct. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951), "[the confidential marital communications privilege] is
based on public policy and with a view to preserve the harmony and the confidence of the
relationship between husband and wife." Id at 503, 80 A.2d at 403.
138. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
139. See Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. Ct. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951). While eighteen
states fail to recognize an incompetency rule or privilege against adverse spousal testimony in
criminal cases, see note 59.supra, all states recognize an incompetency rule or privilege con-
cerning confidential marital communications, see note 142 infra.
B. Current Law Governing Disclosure of Confidential Marital
Communications
Current statutory provisions providing for a confidential marital
communications privilege in criminal' 4° and civil 4 ' proceedings are
substantially re-enactments of the 1887 act. 142 The privilege is the
same today as it was then: confidential communications between
husband and wife cannot be divulged without the consent of both
spouses. 43 Thus, spouses are not absolutely barred from testifying
to confidential marital communications; they may testify by waiving
the privilege.'44
The privilege applies to communications made during a lawful
140. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5914 (Purdon 1981), which reads, "Except as otherwise
provided in this subchapter, in a criminal proceeding neither husband nor wife shall be com-
petent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made by one to the other, unless
this privilege is waived upon the trial."
141. Id § 5923. Section 5923 is identical to section 5914, except "civil matter" appears in
lieu of "criminal proceeding."
142. See notes 127 & 128 and accompanying text supra.
143. 2 HENRY, supra note 46, § 699. In addition to Pennsylvania, ten other states provide
a confidential communications privilege vested in both spouses. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 980
(West 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504 (West 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:461 (West
1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A:2162 (1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5 (Supp. 1979); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22 (West 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2504 (West 1980); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-13, -14 (1979); Wis. STAT.
§ 905.05 (1975).
Sixteen states provide a confidential communications privilege vested in the "other" or
"accused" spouse. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. § 26(b)(2) (1968); Agiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
2232, 13-4062 (1956 & 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, R. EVID. 504 (1979); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1315 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
,§ 26-1-802, 46-16-212 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.295 (1979); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 60.10 (McKinney 1971); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 4502 (McKinney 1963); N.D. R. EVID. 504
(Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); VA. CODE
§ 8.01-398 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4
(1966).
Six states provide a confidential communications privilege vested in the witness-spouse.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 621-29
(1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-56, -57 (Supp. 1979); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 9-17-13, 12-17-10 (1970), construed in State v. Angell, - R.I. -, 405 A.2d 10
(1979); S.C. CODE § 19-11-30 (1977).
Three states provide a confidential communications privilege for the communicator. See
ALA. CODE § 12-21-227 (1975), construed in Arnold v. State, 353 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 1977); GA.
CODE ANN. § 38-418 (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428 (1976).
Fourteen states and the District of Columbia provide that a spouse is incompetent to
testify about confidential communications. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3502 (1979), con-
struedin Duonnolo v. State, 397 A.2d 126 (Del. 1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306 (1973); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns
Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE § 622.9 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (Baldwin 1969); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-105 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (Supp.
1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (Vernon 1953); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.27 (1974); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2404 (1975), con-
struedin McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn. 218, 186 S.W. 95 (1916) and Royston v. State, 450
S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1969); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon
1979); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3715 (Vernon 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605
(1973); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1977).
144. See notes 165-66 and accompanying text infra.
marriage. 45  Communications made before146 or after 147 a lawful
marriage are not privileged. Once the communications are privi-
leged, however, they are always privileged. ' 48 The privilege survives
divorce149 or death.150
To come within the privilege, communications must be made in
confidence and with the intention that they not be divulged. 15 In-
terspousal communications are presumed to be confidential.152 Nev-
ertheless, since the essence of the privilege is to protect confidences,
when the communication is not made in confidence the reason for
the privilege is absent.'53 Since the confidence must also be related
to the marital relationship, 114 business discussions between husband
and wife are not privileged.' 55 Thus, whether a particular communi-
cation is privileged depends upon its nature and the surrounding
circumstances. 1
56
The marital communication privilege generally extends only to
verbal or written communications, 5 7 although some jurisdictions
145. Commonwealth v. Borris, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 372 A.2d 451 (1977); 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 2335. Communications made during cohabitation without the benefit of legal
marriage are not privileged. Id Accord, United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747-48 (9th
Cir. 1977) (privilege for confidential communication depends upon the existence of a valid
marriage as determined by state law), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978).
146. Some courts have disallowed the marital communications privilege when the mar-
riage was a sham. See, e.g., United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1975) (marriage
three days before trial was fraudulent and spurious, entered into in bad faith). "A marriage is
a sham 'if a bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were
married.'" Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Bark v. INS,
511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975)).
147. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied 321 U.S.
794 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964); 8
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2335.
148. Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. Ct. 498, 503, 83 A.2d 401, 403 (1951). Accord,
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434, U.S. 1045 (1978). See generaly 8 WIOMORE, supra note 1,
§§ 2335, 2341.
149. M. Brock & Co. v. Brock, 116 Pa. 109, 9 A. 486 (1887); Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa.
Super. Ct. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951).
150. Cornell v. Vanartsdalen, 4 Pa. 364, 374 (1846) (common-law rule); Hunter v. Hunter,
169 Pa. Super. Ct. 498, 503, 83 A.2d 401, 403 (1951).
151. Commonwealth v. Darush, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. 140, 420 A.2d 1071 (1980). Accord
Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 418 A.2d 605 (1980) (communication was not
privileged because the accused husband took no precautions against a third party hearing the
conversation, even though the conversation was not overheard).
152. Commonwealth v. Darush, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. 140, 420 A.2d 1071 (1980). Accord
Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
153. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2336.
154. Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 199 A.2d 411, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 939
(1964); Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 418 A.2d 605 (1980); 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 2336. See also Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir., 1935) (note to
wife left in conspicuous place was not confidential).
155. Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 199 A.2d 411, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 939
(1964).
156. Commonwealth v. Darush, 279 Pa. Super. Ct. 1.40, 420 A.2d 1071 (1980) (wife was
accused-spouse's bookkeeper).
157. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954). See generaly 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 2337.
have extended the privilege to acts.'58 But not all verbal communi-
cations are within the privilege.' 59 The Pennsylvania Superior Court
recently held that "incoherent mutterings, ravings, or ramblings
which do not constitute true communications" are not privileged. 60
The court did not clarify what it meant by "true communications,"
and this question undoubtedly will be the subject of future litigation.
Implicit in the communications privilege is the requirement that
both spouses be involved. The other spouse must have received the
communication for the privilege to apply.' 6 ' The presence of a third
party when the communication takes place can affect the privileged
status of the communication. Knowledge of the presence of a third
person destroys the confidentiality of the communication; hence, the
privilege does not apply. 162 On the other hand, a communication is
no less privileged just because it is overheard by an eavesdropper. 1
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The privilege, however, does not affect the eavesdropper's compe-
tency to testify. 6' In addition, a spouse's subsequent declarations of
a confidential marital communication in the presence of others does
not remove the confidentiality of the original communication and
the privilege applies.
165
Because the marital communications privilege is vested in both
spouses, the privilege can be exercised by either spouse.166 Thus, it
can be waived either by the witness-spouse's failure to claim it or by
the other spouse's failure to object on the ground that the communi-
158. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1976) ("invocation of
the privilege requires the presence of at least a gesture that is communicative or intended by
one spouse to convey a message to the other"); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 55
S.E.2d 9 (1949) (confidential communications include conduct, acts, signs, and spoken or writ-
ten words made known because of the marital relation).
159. See, e.g., Seitz v. Seitz, 170 Pa. 71, 32 A. 578 (1895) (boastful and defiant statements
of misconduct accompanied by insolent and brutal taunts are not privileged); Commonwealth
v. Rough, 275 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 418 A.2d 605 (1980) (defendant-spouse did not intend com-
munication to be confidential).
160. Commonwealth ex rel. Platt v. Platt, 266 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 283, 404 A.2d 410, 414
(1979).
161. Letters sent but never delivered to the wife were held admissible in Commonwealth
v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 A. 657 (1926), and Commonwealth v. Smith, 270 Pa. 583, 113 A. 844
(1921). When a defendant-spouse dictated letters to a fellow prisoner and then sent them to
his wife, who received them and presumably gave them to the district attorney, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that the letters were privileged and inadmissible against the de-
fendant-spouse. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 221 Pa. 538, 70 A. 865 (1908). Cf. Wolfle v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) (letter dictated by stenographer not privileged because communica-
tions to a spouse can be made conveniently without compromising confidentiality by using a
third person).
162. Dumbach v. Bishop, 183 Pa. 602, 39 A. 48 (1898); Robb's Appeal, 98 Pa. 501 (1881);
Commonwealth v. Peluso, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 330, 361 A.2d 852 (1976), rev'don other grounds,
481 Pa. 641, 393 A.2d 344 (1978).
163. Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. Ct. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951).
164. Id
165. Commonwealth v. Peluso, 240 Pa, Super. Ct. 330, 361 A.2d 852 (1976) (citing White-
head v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737 (1913)). See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1,
§ 2339.
166. See Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 199 A.2d 411 (consent of both spouses
required for admission of confidential communications testimony).
cation was confidential. 67 The burden is on the marital partners to
exercise their privilege.",8
IV. The Inadequacy of the Marital Testimonial Exceptions in
Pennsylvania
The exceptions to the general rule of testimonial compulsion ex-
amined above-the marital incompetency rule and the marital com-
munications privilege-are the only exceptions in Pennsylvania
based on the marital relationship. Although many states recognize a
privilege against adverse spousal testimony, otherwise known as the
antimarital facts privilege,' 69 a similar privilege is not recognized in
Pennsylvania because of the incompetency rule. Both recognized
marital exceptions are governed by statutes, and these statutes are
substantially reenactments of nineteenth century statutes.'70 Unlike
courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions,'' the Pennsylvania
Legislature largely retained the common-law marital exceptions.
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Before these exceptions are evaluated to determine whether they
meet society's needs, 173 several influencing factors must first be
considered.
A. Considerations in Evaluating Marital Testimonial Exceptions
1. Criticism of Marital Testimonial Exceptions. -Scholars,
commentators, and jurists have strongly condemned rules of evi-
dence that render spouses incompetent to testify or bestow a privi-
lege against adverse spousal testimony.'7 4  Perhaps the most often
quoted criticism is from Professor Wigmore's treatise on evidence.
167. Huffman v. Simmons, 131 Pa. Super. Ct. 370, 381, 200 A. 274, 278 (1938).
168. But cf. Commonwealth v. Stots, 436 Pa. 555, 261 A.2d 577 (1970) (failure of spouse to
object does not constitute a waiver of the marital incompetency rule).
169. The privilege against adverse spousal testimony is synonomous with the antimarital
facts privilege. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1045 (1978).
170. See notes 46, 53, 82, 94, 95, 107 & 127 and accompanying text supra.
171. States which no longer adhere to the common-law marital incompetency rule are
listed in note 59 supra. For comments regarding the trend in state and federal law, see notes
183-188 and accompanying text infra.
172. Sections 5913, 5914, 5923, and 5924, which provide for the incompetency rule and
communications privilege in criminal and civil proceedings, still reflect the basic common-law
rules in force prior to legislative enactment of rules of evidence. See notes 59-60 & 139-140
supra.
173. See note 3 supra.
174. See, e.g., Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence." Family
Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929); Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy and Prerogatives- A Criti-
cal Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61
CAL. L. REV. 353 (1973); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228; C. McCoRMWCK, EVIDENCE § 83
(1954).
The Kentucky Supreme Court strongly condemned the marital exception to the general
rule of testimonial compulsion in Wells v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 622 (Ky.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 861 (1978). The court stated: "At its very best, the rule that one party to a marriage
cannot be compelled to testify against the other. . . is one of the most ill-founded precepts to
be found in the common law." Id at 624.
This privilege has no longer adequate reason for retention. In
an age which has so far rationalized, depolarized and
dechivalrized the marital relation and the spirit of femininity as to
be willing to enact complete legal and political equality and inde-
pendence of man and woman, this marital privilege is the merest
anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to
truth in practice. 75
In general, criticisms of marital testimonial exceptions attack
the balance that has been struck between the conflicting societal
needs of preserving the marital relationship and insuring the fair ad-
ministration of justice. 176 Whether the critics advocate restriction or
abolition of marital exceptions, their premise is the same: society's
interest in ascertaining the truth should not be outweighed by any
policy promoting marital harmony through application of an overly
broad exception to testimonial compulsion. 1 7  Only the marital
communications privilege remains relatively free of criticism, al-
though some critics have even advocated limiting its scope.
178
Not everyone has advocated restricting the testimonial excep-
tions. Some critics have called for retention of the marital testimo-
nial exceptions, 7 1 modification of them,'8 0 or even recognition of
new exceptions to the general rule of testimonial compulsion.' 8'
Considerations in creating the marital testimonial exceptions, such
as the inducement to perjury and the potential harm to a preferred
relationship, are still recognized as valid reasons for continuing the
exceptions.8 2 Furthermore, the notion that "persons of even moder-
ate sensibilities must be adversely affected upon observing one
spouse compelled to reveal communications made in the intimacy of
marriage" retains validity.
i8 3
175. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228 at 221.
176. See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981). In Freeman the
defendant exercised the rule of spousal incompetency to exclude evidence of criminal acts
committed in public. Under those circumstances, the court believed that the rule was em-
ployed "more to thwart the system of justice than to promote family peace." Id at -, 276
S.E.2d at 453.
177. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); State v. Freeman, 302 N.C.
591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981).
178. See, e.g., C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 83, at 171 (1954).
179. See, e.g., Borden, In Defense of the Privilegefor Confidential Marital Communications,
39 ALA. LAW. 575 (1978); Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World- Part II, 41
MINN. L. REV. 731, 750 (1957); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges
in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956).
180. See, e.,g., Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal
Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications:. Modern Trend,
38 VA. L. REV. 359 (1952) (recommending that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony
be vested in the witness-spouse alone).
181. See, e.g., Coburn, Child-Parent Communications. Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599 (1969-70); Note, A Suggested Privilege for Confidential Communi-
cation with Marriage Counselors, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 266 (1957).
182. See Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court
Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956).
183. Id at I11.
2. Trend in Other Jurisdictions. -The trend in state and federal
law is to restrict testimonial exceptions based on the marital relation-
ship. Federal law is illustrative. In 1958 the United States Supreme
Court in Hawkins v. United States"8 4 rejected a challenge to the fed-
eral common-law rule of evidence that vested a privilege against ad-
verse spousal testimony in both spouses.I" Thus, the Court decided
to remain in agreement with the thirty-one state jurisdictions that
allowed the accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony.18 6  In
1980 the Court reversed its decision in Hawkins. In Trammel v.
United States,187 the Court held that a privilege against adverse
spousal testimony vests in the witness-spouse alone. Consequently,
an accused-spouse no longer has the privilege to prevent adverse
spousal testimony in federal court.
The Court in Trammel recognized the trend in state law since its
Hawkins decision. No longer did thirty-one states vest a privilege in
the accused-spouse; the number had dropped to twenty-four,1 88 and
the trend continues. In April 1981 the North Carolina Supreme
Court modified the common-law rule preventing adverse spousal
testimony in criminal proceedings, with the effect that testimonial
incompetence extends only to confidential marital
communications. 189
In essence, courts are placing greater weight on the societal need
to ascertain truth than on the need to preserve marital relation-
ships.' 90 Conceivably this reconsideration stems from the lack of
184. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
185. Although he agreed with the Court's judgment in Hawkins, Justice Stewart expressed
grave doubts about the propriety of the adverse spousal testimony privilege.
Any rule that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well
the doing of justice. When such a rule is the product of a conceptualism long ago
discarded, is universally criticized by scholars, and has been qualified or abandoned
in many jurisdictions, it should receive the most careful scrutiny. Surely "reason and
experience" require that we do more than indulge in mere assumptions, perhaps na-
ive assumptions, as to the importance of this ancient rule to the interests of domestic
tranquility.
Id. at 81-82 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
186. Id at 81 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring).
187. 445 U.S. 40 (1980). In modifying the privilege against adverse spousal testimony in
the federal courts, the Supreme Court continued "the evolutionary development of testimonial
privileges in federal criminal trials 'governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted. . . in the light of reason and experience.'" Id at 47 (quoting FED. R. EvID.
501).
188. 445 U.S. at 48 & n.9.
189. Freeman v. State, 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981). See notes 175 and 176 and
accompanying text supra.
190. One result of the courts' emphasis on society's need for evidence is the decision in
State v. Crow, 104 Ariz. 579, 457 P.2d 256 (1969). In Crow the court construed a statute that
disallowed spousal testimony, except for crimes committed by one spouse against the other, to
"allow the testimony in all cases in which the crime committed so closely touches or affects the
other spouse as to render the reason for the rule-promotion of marital peace and apprehen-
sion of marital dissension-inapplicable." Id at -, 457 P.2d at 262. Under this liberal inter-
pretation, the court allowed adverse spousal testimony against a husband who murdered hs
father-in-law and brother-in-law. Id
marital permanence while the marital exceptions were in place, as
illustrated by high divorce rates.
3. Does--or Should-Competency Mean Compellability?-It is
axiomatic that competent witnesses are also compellable wit-
nesses.' 91 Thus, when spouses are competent to testify because of an
exception to the marital incompetency rule, 92 they are also compel-
lable.' 93 An examination of this issue, however, suggests that it is
not, or should not be, so easily resolved as most American courts
believe.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Hess
19 4
held that the benefit of a statutory provision abrogating spousal in-
competency with respect to victimized spouses 9 s extends to the state,
and therefore spouses who are competent witnesses as a result of this
exception are also compellable witnesses.' 96 The court failed to ac-
knowledge, however, that this very narrow exception to the marital
incompetency rule' 97 is basically a statutory enactment of the com-
mon-law rule-a rule originated for the protection of the spouse, not
the state. 98 The manifest incongruity in generally prohibiting ad-
verse spousal testimony from a willing spouse while compelling ad-
verse spousal testimony from a nonwilling victimized spouse is
apparent. In essence, the witness-spouse is being punished by soci-
ety for being a victim of a crime. Furthermore, the Hess decision
conflicts with the public policy rationale for the marital incompe-
191. 8 WIGMORE, sipra note I, § 2245(2) at 264. See Commonwealth v. Galloway, 271
Pa. Super. Ct. 305, 313, 413 A.2d 418, 422 (1979); State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 505, 251 A.2d
442, 445-46 (1969). The principle that competent witnesses are compellable has been statuto-
rily enacted in Pennsylvania. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5941(a) (Purdon 1981). Section
594 1(a) provides,
Except defendants actually upon trial in a criminal proceeding, any competent
witness may be compelled to testify in any matter, civil or criminal, but he may not
be compelled to answer any question which, in the opinion of the trial judge, would
tend to incriminate him; nor may the neglect or refusal of any defendant, actually
upon trial in a criminal proceeding, to offer himself as a witness, be treated as creat-
ing any presumption against him, or be adversely referred to by court or counsel
during the trial.
192. See notes 76-107 and accompanying text supra.
193. Commonwealth v. Hess, 270 Pa. Super. Ct. 501, 411 A.2d 830 (1979). Accord State
v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969); Exparte Moreland, 415 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Ct. Crim.
App. 1967).
194. 270 Pa. Super. Ct. 501, 411 A.2d 830 (1979).
195. The term "victimized spouses" refers to those spouses who have been subjected to
"bodily injury or violence attempted, done or threatened" by their spouses. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5913 (Purdon 1981). See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
196. In Commonwealth v. Hess, 270 Pa. Super. Ct. 501, 411 A.2d 830 (1979), the appel-
lant-spouse had been convicted by a jury of simple and aggravated assault, recklessly endan-
gering another person, terroristic threats, and unlawful restraint against his wife. Affirming
the testimonial compulsion of the appellant's wife, the court noted that if testimony were con-
tingent upon the discretion of the victimized spouse, "it would materially frustrate the legisla-
tive intent of facilitating the prosecution of criminal behavior occurring in a domestic setting
frequently devoid of witnesses other than the spouses themselves." Id at 507, 411 A.2d at 833.
197. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913 (Purdon 1981).
198. See notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra.
* tency rule, for "[w]here [a spouse] refuses to testify, there is strong
evidence that there is still a marital relationship to be protected."' 99
The House of Lords recently considered a case similar to Hess.
In Hoskyn v. Commissioner of Policefor the Metropolis2" the House
of Lords had its first opportunity since 1930 to consider Labsworth's
Case,201 which had held that a spouse who is a competent witness is
also a compellable witness. The House of Lords overruled Lab-
sworth. Thus, the wife of a defendant charged with a crime of vio-
lence against her was not a compellable witness against her
defendant-husband. 
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Lord Wilberforce rejected the idea that competency and com-
pellability are coextensive. He noted that the word "compellability"
was of comparatively recent origin and that the principles are sepa-
rate and should not always be read as "competent and therefore com-
pellable. ' 20 3 Speaking of the marital privilege, he said, "[Tihe
considerations which led the law to treat [the wife] as competent do
not in any way weaken the force of the principle we have stated that
a wife ought not to be forced into the witness box, a principle of
general application and fundamental importance.
As noted by Lord Wilberforce in Hoskyn, the principles of com-
petency and compellability are separate and distinct. American
courts have been too simplistic and superficial in their treatment of
these concepts. For states like Pennsylvania that still retain the mar-
ital incompetency rule, the better view is that competent spouses
should not be compellable unless a societal interest beyond the pro-
tection of the witness-spouses exists, as it does in child-abuse cases.
The same result should apply to states that vest a privilege in the
witness-spouse alone. At the very least the decision whether to com-
pel spousal testimony should be recognized for what it is-a policy
decision.
4. Are Marital Testimonial Exceptions Constitutionally Man-
dated?-The marital incompetency rules and testimonial privileges
are not rooted in the Constitution, but rather are merely common-
law rules of evidence founded upon public policy.205 No Penn-
sylvania court has ever based the marital exceptions to the general
199. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 534 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
200. [1978] 2 All E.R. 136.
201. [19301 All E.R. 340.
202. Australian and Canadian courts have also held that a spouse who is rendered compe-
tent to testify against the other spouse because they were the victim of a crime of violence is
not a compellable witness. See Hoskyn v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [19781 2
All E.R. at 143.
203. Id at 140.
204. Id at 142.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, 457 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Mich. 1978); United States
v. Hicks, 420 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
rule of testimonial compulsion on the Constitution. Arguably, how-
ever, the right to privacy2" is a constitutional guarantee of the mari-
tal testimonial privilege.
In 1978 a New York court, in In re Application o/A and M,
20 7
accepted the right to privacy as a basis for a parent-child testimonial
privilege. The court held that the parents of a sixteen-year-old boy
suspected of arson did not have to testify before a grand jury con-
cerning admissions by the child that were made in confidence to a
parent. The court balanced the state's interest in the factfinding pro-
cess against both the state's interest and the individual's interest in
preserving the family as a viable institution.08 The state's interest in
factfinding yielded because "communications made by a minor child
to his parents within the context of the family relationship may,
under some circumstances, lie within the 'private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.' ,209
Subsequent New York cases further defined this newly recog-
nized right to withhold testimony. In In re Mark G. 210 the court held
that only those statements made to the parent "in confidence and for
the purpose of obtaining support, advice or guidance" 211I are privi-
leged. In People v. Fitzgerald,2t2 however, the court read the consti-
tutional privilege liberally. Thus, the state was precluded from
compelling the testimony of a father of an adult son concerning their
conversations about an automobile accident. 2 3 The Fitzgerald court
206. See Comment, Pillow Talk, Grimgribbers and Connubial Bliss. The Marital Communi-
cation Privilege, 56 IND. L.J. 121, 149 (1980) ("Right of privacy considerations, nevertheless,
preclude the complete abolition of the marital communication privilege").
The following resource materials provide an excellent study of the right to privacy: S.
HOFSTADTER & G. HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY (1964); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM (1970); Beaney, The Right to Privacy andAmerican Law, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
253 (1966); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233 (1977); Shils, Privacy"
Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROS. 281 (1966); Warren and Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
207. 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
208. As the court noted, "The course of constitutional law is filled with instances wherein
the interests of the State in achieving a legitimate goal have been balanced against the rights of
individual privacy guaranteed by the Constitution." Id at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
209. Id at 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)).
The court in In re Application of A and M bottomed its decision on the right to privacy
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), and reaffirmed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Furthermore, the court relied on
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), a substantive due process case, to support its
contention that the integrity of the family is entitled to constitutional protection. Justice Pow-
ell, in his plurality opinion in Moore, had written, "Our decisions establish that the Constitu-
tion protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in the Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass
down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural." Id at 503-04 (footnotes
omitted).
210. 65 App. Div. 2d 917, 410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1978).
211. Id at 917, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 465-66.
212. 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (West. Co. Ct. 1979).
213. According to the Fitzgerald court, the right to privacy, which guarantees the parent-
child testimonial privilege, is derived from the ninth and fourteenth amendments of the United
recognized the tendency of courts to restrict testimonial privileges,2" 4
but it also recognized that "courts cannot shield themselves behind
such a 'tendency' and disregard all such situations where the founda-
tions of certain basic relationships, such as those between family
members may be threatened. 21 5
To date, New York stands alone in its recognition of a constitu-
tional privilege to protect parent-child confidences. At least one
Pennsylvania lower court has refused to- recognize a constitutional
basis for a witness's refusal to testify against his parent.2" 6 Appar-
ently no state has yet to recognize a marital testimonial privilege
founded in the Constitution. Nevertheless, arguments have been ad-
vanced for recognition of a constitutional privacy right to shield at
least some marital confidences from intrusion by the state. 17
Whether such a constitutional privilege will be recognized or not,
many critics agree that the individual's demand for privacy requires
recognition of a limited marital testimonial privilege.
B. Evaluating Pennsylvania's Marital Testimonial Exceptions
Since the early common-law justifications for the marital excep-
tions to the general rule of testimonial compulsion are no longer
valid,2" 8 the decision whether to restrict, abolish, or continue the
marital exceptions in Pennsylvania is solely a public policy decision.
Society must decide whether the costs of continuing the present
rules--costs to the fair administration of justice-are justified in
view of the speculative benefits to the marital relationship. An
equally important consideration is the potential cost to society in
compelling spousal testimony in all cases, without exception. As dis-
cussed above, public policy and constitutional arguments militate
against a complete abrogation of the marital testimonial exceptions.
Society should consider the dilemma of spouses who are com-
pelled to testify against their will. In effect, they have the following
three options: refuse to testify and be held in contempt of court;
commit perjury; testify and risk irreparable harm to the marriage
States Constitution and art. I, §§ 1, 6, of the New York Constitution. Id at 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d
at 314.
214. See notes 183-189 and accompanying text supra.
215. 101 Misc. 2d at 715, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
216. Commonwealth v. Pastirko, 19 Cambria Co. L.J. 231 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
217. See, e.g., Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges-Reprint of a Letter to a Con-
gressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45; Note, The Husband- Wife Testimonial Privilege in the Federal
Courts, 59 B.U. L. REV. 894 (1979).
"A possible explanation for interpersonal testimonial privileges is that they are important
protectors of the right of privacy .... [PIroperly understood and implemented, the simple
exclusion of privileged evidence at trial can be viewed as an important and well-designed
adjunct to the right of privacy." Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence., A Suggested Approach, 64 GEo. L.J. 613, 647-48 (1976).
218. See notes 34, 43, 48 & 49 and accompanying text supra..
they thought was worth saving. On the other hand, society should
realistically look at the wisdom in prohibiting adverse testimony by a
willing spouse. 219 A marital partner is surely better able to evaluate
the viability of a marriage than is a court or legislature.
By prohibiting adverse spousal testimony regardless of the
spouse's desires, 220 the Pennsylvania Legislature runs the risk of pro-
tecting moribund marriages at the expense of the fair administration
of justice. Quite simply, there is no justification for such a broad
marital incompetency rule.22 ' The goal of preserving viable mar-
riages could be better served by vesting a privilege against adverse
spousal testimony in the witness-spouse alone.222 Under such a priv-
ilege, society would still offer protection to viable marital relation-
ships, but would no longer needlessly exclude voluntary testimony in
cases in which no marriage exists to preserve.
Total abrogation of the marital exceptions, however, would re-
sult in an intolerable intrusion into the marital relationship. 223 The
value of spousal testimony would not justify an unrestrained intru-
sion into the intimacies of the marital relationship. The current law
as reflected in Commonwealth v. Hess224 is such an intrusion because
it conflicts with the public policy of preserving viable marriages, and
therefore should be changed. Ample reason exists for allowing a
physically abused spouse to testify against the accused-spouse; no
overriding reason justifies compulsion of such testimony.225 Only
certain circumstances may justify an unwelcomed intrusion into the
marital relationship. Society's interest in protecting abused children,
for example, undoubtedly outweighs its interest in protecting a mar-
riage that condones such abusive acts.
The legislature's decision to bestow a privileged status on confi-
dential marital communications226 should be reevaluated especially
if the incompetency rule is abolished. In this event, a privilege
should be vested in the witness-spouse alone. Again, the protection
219. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 534 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The
Chief Justice noted that a spouse's refusal to testify indicates the existence of a viable mar-
riage; conversely, a spouse's willingness to testify should indicate the existence of a marriage
not worthy of protection.
220. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
221. The lack of adequate justification for the common-law incompetency rule still re-
tained by Pennsylvania is illustrated by the very few number of states that continue to recog-
nize the rule. The vast majority of the American jurisdictions no longer recognize a total bar
to adverse spousal testimony. See note 59 supra.
222. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
223. The harm to the human personality, and hence to freedom, outweighs any benefit to
the administration of justice derived from total abrogation of testimonial privileges. Louisell,
The Psychologist in Today's Legal World- Part 1H, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731, 750 (1957).
224. 270 Pa. Super. Ct. 501, 411 A.2d 830 (1979). The Hess holding allows testimonial
compulsion when the spouse is competent. See notes 193-197 and accompanying text supra.
225. See State v. Todd, 173 La. 23, 136 So. 76 (1931); Hoskyn v. Commissioner of Police
for the Metropolis [1978] 2 All E.R. 36.
226. See notes 124-127 and accompanying text supra.
offered by vesting a privilege in the witness-spouse would provide
adequate safeguards against excessive intrusion by the state, but at
the same time a willing spouse could testify. Furthermore, such a
change would have no effect on the marital relationship. Not even
avid proponents of the privilege suggest that marital communica-
tions are made with knowledge of and reliance on a testimonial priv-
ilege.227 Elimination of the communications distinction would also
have the added benefit of uniformity since the same rule could apply
to all spousal testimony.
V. Conclusion
Undeniably, the marriage institution does not retain the same
lofty status today that it enjoyed in the nineteenth century when the
Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the common-law marital excep-
tions to the general rule of testimonial compulsion. Nevertheless,
the general proposition that society should favor the preservation of
marital relationships is still presumed valid. Because of societal
changes and the increased need to ascertain all relevant facts in the
administration of justice, Pennsylvania's marital testimonial excep-
tions no longer meet the needs of society. The exclusion of testi-
mony from willing spouses is simply not justified. On the other
hand, while a marital testimonial privilege may not be necessary to
preserve marital relationships, it is essential to preserve the realm of
family privacy that the state cannot invade. Control over the revela-
tion of information related to the intimacies of marriage is a right to
be enjoyed by all free people. By vesting a privilege in the witness-
spouse alone for all spousal testimony, except in child-abuse cases,
the Pennsylvania Legislature could simultaneously enhance society's
ability to administer justice and continue to protect viable marriages.
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